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Sturgeon v. Frost: Alaska’s Wild Lands 
and Wild Laws Prove the Need for a 
Mistake-of-Law Defense 
Paul J. Larkin, Jr.* & John-Michael Seibler** 
Two men walk into a bar. One is Bert Frost, Alaska Regional 
Director for the National Park Service (NPS); the other is 
Alaskan moose-hunter John Sturgeon, who is riding a hovercraft 
(okay, it’s a floating bar). Bert tells John, “Hey, you’re on federal 
land, and there is a ban on hovercrafts. I could have you charged 
with a crime.” John responds, “No, I’m on state land, and Alaska 
permits me to travel by hovercraft.” Bert replies, “Well, I 
disagree, but I won’t do anything about it this time. Just don’t 
use a hovercraft on federal land again.”  Bert finishes his drink 
and leaves. 
That story reads like the standard “a man walks into a bar” 
joke. What makes it different is that those facts describe a case 
pending before the Supreme Court of the United States.1 Before it 
recesses for the term, the Court will decide whether federal or 
state law applies on large and intricately interwoven swaths of 
land in Alaska called Conservation System Units (CSUs).2 A 
                                                                                                     
 *  Senior Legal Research Fellow, The Heritage Foundation; M.P.P. George 
Washington University, 2012; J.D. Stanford Law School, 1980; B.A. Washington 
& Lee University, 1977.   
 ** Visiting Fellow, The Heritage Foundation; J.D. Washington & Lee 
University, 2015; B.A., Boston University, 2011. The views expressed in this 
article are the authors’ own and should not be construed as representing any 
official position of The Heritage Foundation.  We want to thank John Malcolm 
for valuable comments on an earlier version of this Article.  Any mistakes are 
our own. 
 1. See Sturgeon v. Frost, No. 14-1209 (9th Cir. Feb. 18, 2015), 
SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/sturgeon-v-masica/ 
(last visited Jan. 6, 2016) (detailing the issue of the case and pre-hearing brief 
filings of interested parties) [hereinafter Sturgeon] (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 2. See id. (stating the issue of the case as “whether section 103(c) of the 
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980 prohibits the National 
Park Service from exercising regulatory control over State, Native Corporation, 
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ruling for the federal government could make midwinters bleak 
for anyone who travels the vast, uninhabited, and unexplored 
lands in Alaska—a state twice the size of Texas, with the lowest 
population density in the nation3—because the NPS’s rulebook 
contains some arcane, strict-liability criminal regulatory 
offenses.4 Alaska’s geography and the unpredictable location of 
unmarked federal land are the real problem in this case because 
they make it difficult to know where state land ends and federal 
land begins. Reasonable people will not know what laws apply or 
where, and a wrong turn can lead to imprisonment.  Accordingly, 
this case is a paradigmatic example of the need for a Mistake-of-
Law Defense.5  
I. The Facts of Sturgeon v. Frost 
In September 2007, John Sturgeon was operating his 
hovercraft on a moose hunt, as he had done for more than twenty 
years. While stopped on the Nation River to make repairs, armed 
NPS agents arrived. After a brief conversation, an agent 
“whipped out a rule book” and read, “The operation or use of 
hovercraft is prohibited.”6 The agents then did exactly what they 
should have done: they likely realized that the man was honestly 
                                                                                                     
and private Alaska land physically located within the boundaries of the 
National Park System”). 
 3. See Alaska Kid’s Corner, STATE OF ALASKA (2016), 
http://alaska.gov/kids/learn/population.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2016) (“Alaska 
contains 586,000 square miles of land. It is . . . two and a half times larger than 
Texas . . . .Alaska has .93 square miles for each person in the state; by 
comparison, New York has .003 square miles per person.”) (on file with 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 4. See, e.g., 54 U.S.C. § 100722 (2012) (imposing strict liability for and 
listing the relevant standards and exceptions to causing any injury or 
destruction to a National Park System Unit, including through the use of “any 
instrumentality”). 
 5. For an explanation of the mistake of law defense, see Edwin Meese III 
& Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Reconsidering the Mistake of Law Defense, 102 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 725 (2012). 
 6. Erica Martinson, Alaska-US Power Struggle over Moose Hunter Heads 
to the Supreme Court, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (Dec. 25, 2015), 
http://www.adn.com/article/20151225/alaska-us-power-struggle-over-moose-
hunter-heads-supreme-court (last visited Jan. 27, 2016) (on file with 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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and reasonably mistaken about the fact that he was on federal 
land, probably because there was no sign posted telling Sturgeon 
where he was, the agents gave Sturgeon a warning, and let him 
haul his hovercraft home with a motor boat.7  
Sturgeon believes that he did nothing wrong, however, 
because NPS regulations did not apply. In his opinion, Congress, 
in the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980 
(ANILCA), left control over all non-federal land within CSUs to 
the state.8 That is true even though large tracts of federal and 
non-federal land overlap. Sturgeon sued the federal government 
hoping to persuade the courts that he is right. While the state of 
Alaska is on Sturgeon’s side, the lower federal courts ruled 
against Sturgeon and Alaska, holding that NPS regulations apply 
to CSUs, which means that hovercraft usage is prohibited.9 The 
Supreme Court granted review and heard oral argument in 
January 2016.10 
Perhaps, John Sturgeon will once more ride his hovercraft 
down the Nation River; perhaps he will not. “But one thing is 
certain: The case is no longer solely about one man and his 
boat.”11 The numerous organizations that have filed amicus briefs 
in the Supreme Court prove how many disparate interests are at 
stake.12  
                                                                                                     
 7. See id. (“Sturgeon says the federal government shouldn’t have any 
authority over the water he was in. Nevertheless, he loaded his hovercraft on a 
motor boat and it remains in his yard in Anchorage, the engine mothballed for 
safe-keeping, more than eight years later.”). 
 8. See 16 U.S.C. § 3101(d) (2012) (“Congress believes that the need for 
future legislation designating new conservation system units, new national 
conservation areas, or new national recreation areas, has been obviated 
thereby.”). 
 9. See Martinson, supra note 6 (discussing Sturgeon’s supporters and the 
State of Alaska’s position and brief filings, as well as the disposition of the case 
in lower courts); see also Sturgeon v. Masica, 768 F.3d 1066, 1069–71 (9th Cir. 
2014) (providing the opinion of the Ninth Circuit on appeal and discussing the 
facts and lower court disposition of the case). 
 10. See Sturgeon, supra note 1 (listing the dates of the certiorari petition 
and grant, as well as the dates for arguments). 
 11. Martinson, supra note 6. 
 12. Alaska’s congressional delegation (U.S. Senators Dan Sullivan and Lisa 
Murkowski; Representative Don Young) filed an amicus brief, and nearly three-
dozen other organizations filed additional briefs. See Sturgeon, supra note 1 
(providing a list of the individuals and organizations that filed amicus briefs). 
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Interestingly, even though this dispute began with an alleged 
crime, the parties and amici do not discuss the problems that 
criminal enforcement of the NPS regulations create for people 
like Sturgeon.13 Those problems are serious ones, however, and 
arise from two facts: first, vast, uninhabited, unsurveyed areas in 
Alaska do not clearly signal when someone has crossed onto 
federal property. Second, NPS regulations buried deep within the 
Code of Federal Regulations punish conduct that no one would 
instinctively assume is wrong. Together, those facts call for 
application of a Mistake-of-Law defense.14 
II. Regulatory Offenses Raise Particularly Troublesome Notice 
Problems for Criminal Law 
The NPS agents did not question Sturgeon because he was 
committing a violent crime, because he was transporting a 
controlled substance like heroin, or even because he was handling 
his hovercraft in a reckless manner. No, the agents told Sturgeon 
that his use of a hovercraft on federal property was a crime 
punishable by imprisonment.15 Given that Article I of the 
Constitution grants “[a]ll legislative Powers”16 to Congress, it 
might seem odd that the NPS, a federal administrative agency, 
would have the authority to define crimes.17 Yet, the Supreme 
Court has held that Congress may delegate that power to 
agencies. In United States v. Grimaud,18 the Court concluded that 
                                                                                                     
 13. See generally Craig W. Richards, Brief of Amicus Curiae State of Alaska 
Supporting Petitioner, SCOTUSBLOG (May 4, 2015), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/14-
1209.Sturgeon.v.Masica.State_.Alaska.Amicus.Brief_.Cert_.Petition.5.4.15....pdf 
(offering the full text of Alaska’s amicus brief). 
 14. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing Mistake-of-Law 
jurisprudence). 
 15. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (defining the regulations in 
question and showing that the mere use of “any instrumentality” on the 
relevant federal land constitutes a federal offense under the statute). 
 16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 17. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., The Dynamic Incorporation of Foreign Law, and 
the Constitutional Regulation of Federal Lawmaking, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
337, 356–59 (2015) (noting that the text of the Constitution appears to grant 
Congress exclusive legislative authority). 
 18. 220 U.S. 506 (1911). 
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“the authority to make administrative rules is not a delegation of 
legislative power, nor are such rules raised from an 
administrative to a legislative character because the violation 
thereof is punished as a public offense.”19 Grimaud appears to 
end the discussion of the NPS regulations.  
Yet it does not; Grimaud only answered the question of 
whether Congress may delegate to agencies rulemaking authority 
enforceable through the criminal law.20 The answer says nothing 
about the entirely separate issues of whether the government has 
the obligation to notify the public when agency regulations expose 
them to criminal liability and whether the government can 
satisfy that burden simply by publishing those rules in the Code 
of Federal Regulations. The answers to those questions, it turns 
out, are “yes” and “no,” respectively. 
A. The Federal Government Must Notify the Public of Federal 
Offenses 
It is settled law that the Due Process Clause requires the 
government to afford everyone notice of the conduct made a 
crime.21 The Court has developed three related doctrines to 
enforce that requirement. The Rule of Lenity directs courts to 
construe ambiguities in criminal statutes in a defendant’s favor.22 
The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine prohibits criminal enforcement 
of an insolubly ambiguous or indecipherable statute.23 The 
                                                                                                     
 19. Id. at 521. 
 20. See id. (holding that Congress’ grant to a federal agency of the 
authority to make administrative rules enforced by the criminal law is not an 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power). 
 21. See, e.g., Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939) (“No one 
may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the 
meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what the State 
commands or forbids.”); see also Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 459 (2001) 
(identifying “core due process concepts of notice, foreseeability, and, in 
particular, the right to fair warning as those concepts bear on the 
constitutionality of attaching criminal penalties to what previously had been 
innocent conduct”). 
 22. See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1088 (2015) (plurality 
opinion) (noting that “ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes 
should be resolved in favor of lenity”) (internal punctuation omitted)). 
 23. See, e.g., United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954) (holding 
that a criminal statute is unconstitutionally vague if it “fails to give a person of 
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Unreasonable Expansion Doctrine prohibits courts from 
retroactively applying a statute in an unforeseeable manner.24 
Together, those doctrines ensure that no one can be punished 
without receiving fair warning of the line between legal and 
illegal conduct.25 If that were not the case, the government could 
create laws in secret, wait for an unsuspecting person to cross an 
invisible line, and then pounce on someone who reasonably 
believed that he was law-abiding, a result that the courts have 
found intolerable.26 Accordingly, the first question must be 
answered affirmatively. 
B. Listing Agency Rules in the Code of Federal Regulations Does 
Not Invariably Provide Adequate Notice 
Here is where the rubber meets the road. The problem for 
people like Sturgeon—“a person of ordinary intelligence,”27 
precisely the type of person whom the government must 
notify28—is that the federal government does not notify them of 
                                                                                                     
ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by 
the statute”). 
 24. See, e.g., Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 352 (1964) (“[A] 
deprivation of the right of fair warning can result not only from vague statutory 
language but also from an unforeseeable and retroactive judicial expansion of 
narrow and precise statutory language.”). 
 25. See, e.g., Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Finding Room in the Criminal Law for the 
Desuetude Principle, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. COMMENTS. 1, 3 (2014) (“An elementary 
principle of criminal and constitutional law is that the government must 
identify particular conduct as criminal so that the average person, without 
resort to legal advice, can comply with the law. Three complimentary doctrines 
reinforce that principle.”).   
 26. See, e.g., Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 96 (1945) (plurality 
opinion) (“To enforce such a [vague] statute would be like sanctioning the 
practice of Caligula who ‘published the law, but it was written in a very small 
hand, and posted up in a corner, so that no one could make a copy of it.’”); see 
also 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, pt. 1, § 2, 
at 45 (1753) (noting that Caligula “wrote his laws in a very small character, and 
hung them up upon high pillars, the more effectually to ensnare the people.”). 
 27. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954). 
 28. Criminal laws must be understandable by the average person. See, e.g., 
Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881, 892 (2014) (noting “the need to express 
criminal laws in terms ordinary persons can comprehend”); Connally v. Gen. 
Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (“[A] statute which either forbids or 
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence 
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what agency regulations can land them in jail. In fact, the 
government makes no effort to notify the public that it has 
created any new offenses. The government publishes criminal 
statutes in the U.S. Code and agency rules in the Code of Federal 
Regulations, but that is the extent of the government’s effort to 
notify the public of what is a crime. Beyond that, the government 
“privatizes” its notice obligation. The government leaves to 
parents, friends, teachers, ministers, other adults in their 
communities, the media, and so forth the burden of informing 
young and old alike what is unlawful, principally, the argument 
goes, because there is no other ready way to provide that 
information.29   
Historically, the government’s “privatization” has not been a 
problem. People learn the mores and customs of the community 
from the people just mentioned, and the criminal code only 
outlawed conduct that any reasonable person would have known 
to be immoral or dangerous (for example, murder, rape, and 
theft).30 In addition, the criminal law required the government to 
prove in each case that a particular individual acted with an “evil 
intent,” known to the criminal law as mens rea.31 The common-
                                                                                                     
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates 
the first essential of due process of law.”). 
 29. See United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 309 (1992) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“It may well be true that in 
most cases the proposition that the words of the United States Code or the 
Statutes at Large give adequate notice to the citizen is something of a 
fiction, . . . albeit one required in any system of law[.]”); John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., 
Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 
207 (1985) (“Publication of a statute’s text always suffices; the government need 
make no further effort to apprise the people of the content of the law.”). 
 30. See, e.g., OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 125 (Belknap 
Press 2009) (1881) (“[T]he fact that crimes are also generally sins is one of the 
practical justifications for requiring a man to know the criminal law.”); JOHN 
SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 427 (8th ed. 1930) (“The common law is in great part 
nothing more than common honesty and common sense. Therefore although a 
man may be ignorant that he is breaking the law, he knows very well in most 
cases that he is breaking the rule of right.”); Livingston Hall & Selig J. 
Seligman, Mistake of Law and Mens Rea, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 641, 644 (1940) 
(“[T]he early criminal law appears to have been well integrated with the mores 
of the time, out of which it arose as ‘custom.’”).  
 31. See Eugene J. Chesney, Concept of Mens Rea in the Criminal Law, 29 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 627, 637–38 (1939) (discussing the historical 
progression of evil intent to mens rea). 
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law rule was “actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea”32—a crime 
consists of “a vicious will” and “an unlawful act consequent upon 
such vicious will.”33 Together, those features of the criminal law 
prevented morally blameless parties from being convicted.  
But those two elements no longer guarantee that the average 
person knows where to find the line between what is lawful and 
unlawful. The law and life have changed since common law days, 
and the Supreme Court has not yet caught up with those 
developments. 
Beginning in the nineteenth century, legislatures adopted a 
series of nontraditional criminal laws known as “public welfare 
offenses”34—“infractions, violations, or crimes that can be 
committed without any intent to break the law, any knowledge of 
what the law is, or even any negligence in learning what the law 
prohibits.”35 Public welfare offenses consist in the violation of 
health, safety, environmental, housing, and financial rules 
designed to protect the public against the hazards of 
industrialization, urbanization, and commerce.36 These new 
crimes often forbid non-blameworthy conduct and dispense with 
any proof of an evil intent, thereby eliminating any consideration 
of blameworthiness. Strict liability offenses are categorically 
different from common-law crimes.37 
                                                                                                     
 32. Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 974 (1932) (“An 
act does not make one guilty unless the mind is guilty.”). 
 33. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, bk. 4, ch. 2, § 20, at 2175; see also, e.g., 
Roscoe Pound, Introduction to FRANCIS BOWES SAYRE, A SELECTION OF CASES ON 
CRIMINAL LAW 8–9 (1927) (“Historically, our substantive criminal law is based 
upon a theory of punishing the vicious will. It postulates a free agent confronted 
with a choice between doing right and doing wrong and choosing freely to do 
wrong.”).  
 34. See, e.g., Francis Bowes Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. 
REV. 55, 67 (1933) (“The decisions permitting convictions of light police offenses 
without proof of a guilty mind came just at the time when the demands of an 
increasingly complex social order required additional regulation of an 
administrative character unrelated to questions of personal guilt[.]”). 
 35. Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Strict Liability Offenses, Incarceration, and the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1065, 1067 
(2014) [hereinafter Larkin, Strict Liability Offenses]. 
 36. See Sayre, supra note 34, at 67 (noting that public welfare offense first 
arose “in the adulterated food and liquor cases” and other regulations necessary 
to regulation). 
 37. “The environmental laws, for example, allow manufacturers to 
discharge certain pollutants into the air, water, or land so long as a responsible 
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The enactment of those laws created a notice problem that 
was unknown to the common law. No longer can the average 
person rely on the Decalogue or community norms. Now, 
knowledge of intricate rules, sometimes requiring scientific 
knowledge, can be required, even though the average person 
cannot be expected to know that information. It is reasonable to 
enforce strict liability rules through the civil or administrative 
process, but using the criminal law to enforce public welfare 
offenses can demand too much knowledge of the average person.38 
Everyone knows the law forbids murder, rape, and pillaging. Few 
know whether garbage is a “hazardous waste.” Given the federal 
government’s decision to rely on private parties to provide the 
notice required by the Due Process Clause, this transition poses a 
grave risk of convicting morally blameless parties because the 
burden of providing the necessary information is more than the 
community can bear. The average person receives his or her legal 
training from other average persons, not from law school 
professors, and certainly not from scientists. The result is to 
demand that the public not only perform a duty that is properly 
the government’s burden to discharge—notifying everyone where 
the line between lawful and unlawful conduct lies under federal 
statutes—but also sometimes to ensure that everyone is educated 
                                                                                                     
party has a permit for that activity and does not exceed the maximum 
authorized amount each period. By contrast, no one can obtain a permit to 
commit a bank robbery, and there is no maximum number of burglaries that a 
person can commit during a calendar year.” Larkin, Strict Liability Offenses, 
supra note 35, at 1093–94 (citations omitted). 
 38. For that reason, criminal scholars have consistently condemned strict 
liability offenses. See, e.g., LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 77 (2d ed. 
1969) (“Strict criminal liability has never achieved respectability in our law.”); 
H.L.A. Hart, Negligence, Mens Rea, and Criminal Responsibility, in H.L.A. 
HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 152 
(1968) (“Strict liability is odious[.]”); Herbert Wechsler, The Challenge of a 
Model Penal Code, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1097, 1109 (1952)  
The most that can be said for such provisions [prescribing liability 
without regard to any mental factor] is that where the penalty is 
light, where knowledge normally obtains and where a major burden 
of litigation is envisioned, there may be some practical basis for a 
stark limitation of the issues; and large injustice can seldom be done. 
If these considerations are persuasive, it seems clear, however, that 
they ought not to persuade where any major sanction is involved. 
See generally Larkin, Strict Liability Offenses, supra note 35, at 1121 n.46 
(collecting authorities). 
STURGEON V. FROST 385 
about highly-reticulated, scientifically-based regulatory schemes 
that only a small number of people understand well.  
The three doctrines noted above—the Rule of Lenity, the 
Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine, and the Unforeseeable Expansion 
Doctrine—recognize that there is a limit on the knowledge that 
the criminal law can demand a person to have. Regulatory crimes 
can often cross that line. While “[i]t is reasonable to expect that 
the average person knows not to murder, rape, rob, or swindle 
someone else,” it is “unreasonable to assume that that average 
person has the same legal knowledge as an attorney, let alone 
that he has as much scientific expertise as an agency official with 
a doctorate in biochemistry.”39  
Two additional factors aggravate the notice problem. First, 
legislatures often delegate lawmaking authority to 
administrative agencies for a variety of reasons, such as the 
ability to enable agency officials knowledgeable about a technical 
or scientific subject to bring their expertise to bear on newly 
emerging problems or newly developed science.40 Those delegations 
greatly increase the amount of law that someone must know to 
remain law-abiding and can demand far more knowledge than the 
average person has. There were only nine felonies at common 
law,41 whereas today there are more than 4,000 federal criminal 
laws,42 and the number of pertinent regulations has been 
estimated to exceed 300,000.43  No one could know all of those 
laws44 (remember: one of the NPS agents had to pull out a 
                                                                                                     
 39. Larkin, Strict Liability Offenses, supra note 35, at 1092–93. 
 40. Id. at 1088–89. 
 41. STUART P. GREEN, 13 WAYS TO STEAL A BICYCLE: THEFT LAW IN THE 
INFORMATION AGE 10, 280 n.3 (2012) (reporting that, by the 1160s, the nine 
felonies included: murder, rape, manslaughter, robbery, sodomy, larceny, arson, 
mayhem, and burglary). 
 42. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Regulatory Crimes and the Mistake of Law 
Defense, HERITAGE FOUND. LEGAL MEMORANDUM No. 157 at 4 (July 9, 2015), 
http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2015/pdf/LM157.pdf [hereinafter Larkin, 
Regulatory Crimes]. 
 43. John Malcolm, Criminal Law and the Administrative State: The 
Problem with Criminal Regulations, HERITAGE FOUND. LEGAL MEMORANDUM NO. 
130 at 3 (Aug. 6, 2015), 
http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2014/pdf/LM130.pdf. 
 44. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes, 86 VA. L. REV. 1871, 
1881 (2000) (“Ordinary people do not have the time or training to learn the 
contents of criminal codes; indeed, even criminal law professors rarely know 
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rulebook to find the hovercraft regulation45), especially because 
they do not necessarily mirror any prevailing moral code.46 And 
the normal sources of instruction—family, church, community, 
and so forth—cannot make up the difference because “the 
average person learns the law from other average persons, not 
from individuals educated, trained, and experienced in what a 
technical regulatory scheme forbids.”47 
The second factor stems from how agencies make law. 
Agency officials responsible for implementing regulatory schemes 
often construe relevant statutes and regulations in publicly 
available memoranda called “guidance documents” or “compliance 
manuals.”48 Those documents are an important source of law 
because the courts defer to an agency’s interpretation of its 
governing laws.49 Yet, agencies also may prepare memoranda 
outlining criteria to be considered when interpreting laws that 
are difficult for the average person to find or that the agency does 
not make public. Memoranda like that are “tantamount to 
“‘secret’ or ‘underground’” laws.50 Allowing someone to be 
                                                                                                     
much about what conduct is and isn’t criminal in their jurisdictions.”). 
 45. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (recounting the interaction 
between the park agent and Mr. Sturgeon).  
 46. See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW § 9.3.4, at 
731–32 (1978) (“The tight moral consensus that once supported the criminal law 
has obviously disappeared. . . . In a pluralistic society, saddled with criminal 
sanctions affecting every area of life, one cannot expect that everyone know 
what is criminal and what is not.”). 
 47. Larkin, Strict Liability Offenses, supra note 35, at 1090. 
 48. Paul J. Larkin, Jr., The Dynamic Incorporation of Foreign Law and the 
Constitutional Regulation of Federal Lawmaking, 38 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 
337, 384 (2015). 
 49. See, e.g., Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (deferring to the 
Secretary of Labor’s interpretation of regulations regarding disciplinary 
deductions of pay); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 865 (1984) (holding that the EPA’s interpretation of a statutory term was 
entitled to deference). 
 50. See Larkin, Strict Liability Offenses, supra note 35 (paraphrasing 
Kathleen F. Brickey, Environmental Crime at the Crossroads: The Intersection of 
Environmental and Criminal Law Theory, 71 TUL. L. REV. 487, 502–03 (1996) 
(“[M]uch of environmental law is hidden in detailed preambles that are not 
published in the Code of Federal Regulations with the regulations they explain, 
and in private informal guidance memoranda and letters—hence, the problem of 
‘underground’ environmental law.”)). 
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convicted for violating such memoranda would be like treating 
the secret laws of Caligula51 as valid.   
For those reasons, mere publication of regulations in the 
Code of Federal Regulations of the Federal Register does not 
satisfy the Due Process requirement that the government notify 
the public of what conduct is a crime, whether or not it is a strict 
liability offense. 
III. NPS’s Nonobvious Criminal Regulations and Alaska’s Vast, 
Wild, and Unmarked Terrain Provide a Paradigmatic Case for 
Application of the Mistake-of-Law Defense 
Some NPS rules outlaw innocuous conduct, and many 
regulations create strict liability. Driving a hovercraft on state 
property, for example, is lawful in Alaska, so there is no reason to 
presume that people like Sturgeon know that the same conduct is 
a crime on federal land. Other kindred NPS regulations are the 
following: 
• It is a crime to roll something down a hillside or 
mountainside.52 
• It is a crime to toss a rock into a valley or a canyon.53  
• It is a crime to park your car in a way that 
inconveniences someone.54 
• It is a crime to ski, snowshoe, ice skate, sled, inner 
tube, toboggan, or do any “similar winter sports” on a 
road or “parking area” “open to motor vehicle 
traffic.”55  
• It is a crime to “allow” a pet to make a noise that 
“frightens wildlife.”56  
                                                                                                     
 51. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, pt. 1, § 2, at 46 (describing the 
deceptive publishing practices of Caligula). 
 52. See 36 C.F.R. § 2.1(a)(3) (2015) (“Tossing, throwing or rolling rocks or 
other items inside caves or caverns, into valleys, canyons, or caverns, down 
hillsides or mountainsides, or into thermal features.”). 
 53. Id.  
 54. See id. § 261.10(f) (“Placing a vehicle or other object in such a manner 
that it is an impediment or hazard to the safety or convenience of any person.”). 
 55. Id. § 2.19(a). 
 56. See id. § 2.15(a)(4) (prohibiting “[a]llowing a pet to make noise that is 
unreasonable considering location, time of day or night, impact on park users, 
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• It is a crime to use aircraft on a hunting or fishing 
expedition.57 (Consider here that Alaska’s terrain is so 
rugged, that even its capital city of Juneau is 
accessible only by plane or boat. So, if you want to go 
hunting or fishing from Juneau, and do not know if 
you will cross NPS territory, you better take a boat.) 
• Depending on how you interpret the word “structure,” 
a park employee could determine that it is a crime to 
pitch a tent or tree-stand.58  
If you think that those crimes seem far removed from 
conduct ordinarily understood as blameworthy, you are right. 
Criminal law and regulatory law exist for different purposes. 
Criminal law “enforce[s] the moral code that every person knows 
by heart.”59 By contrast, regulations “efficiently manage 
components of the national economy using civil rules, rewards, 
and penalties to incentivize desirable behavior without casting 
aspersions on violations attributable to ignorance or explanations 
other than defiance.”60 Treating conduct as trivial as tossing a 
rock down a hillside in the same way that we treat “common-law 
crimes like murder, robbery, or theft ‘ignores the profound 
difference between the two classes of offenses and puts parties 
engaged in entirely legitimate activities without any intent to 
break the law at risk of criminal punishment.’”61 Yet, such 
regulations are abundant, inaccessible, and out of touch with 
                                                                                                     
and other relevant factors, or that frightens wildlife by barking, howling, or 
making other noise”). 
 57. See id. § 13.450(a) (“Notwithstanding the provisions 43 CFR 
[§] 36.11(f) the use of aircraft for access to or from lands and waters within a 
national park or monument for purposes of taking fish or wildlife for subsistence 
uses within the national park or monument is prohibited except as provided in 
this section.”). 
 58. See id. § 261.10(a) (“Constructing, placing, or maintaining any kind of 
road, trail, structure, fence, enclosure, communication equipment, significant 
surface disturbance, or other improvement on National Forest System lands or 
facilities without a special-use authorization, contract, or approved operating 
plan when such authorization is required.”). It is a crime to abandon such 
personal property. Id. § 261.10(e).  
 59. Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Prohibition, Regulation, and Overcriminalization: 
The Proper and Improper Uses of the Criminal Law, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 745, 
747 (2014) (internal citations omitted). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Larkin, Regulatory Crimes, supra note 42. 
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common morals, depriving the average person of adequate notice 
of what the law prohibits. For reasons such as those, two former 
Attorneys General—Michael Mukasey62 and Edwin Meese III63—
have urged adoption of a Mistake-of-Law defense. 
Alaska exemplifies the need for this defense because the 
state’s terrain makes the notice problem particularly 
complicated.64 Alaska has extraordinarily long days in the 
summer and long nights in the winter due to its far northern 
latitude.65 The way people live and move around in the state can 
be influenced by “[v]iolent storms and fog conditions,”66 
whiteouts, and frigid temperatures. Alaska has a “minimum 
average January temperature of -20° F” in some interior areas 
and “of 18° F” in some coastal areas.67 A region of basins and 
plateaus rests in between two immense mountain systems, the 
Pacific Mountains and Valleys, and “a northward extension” of 
the Rocky Mountains.68 Because these geographic features are 
                                                                                                     
 62. See Michael B. Mukasey & Paul J. Larkin, Jr., The Perils of 
Overcriminalization, HERITAGE FOUND., LEGAL MEMORANDUM No. 146 (Feb. 12, 
2015), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/02/the-perils-of-
overcriminalization (discussing the recent increase in federal laws that impose 
criminal penalties and how this increases the chance of someone being charged 
with a crime for an honest mistake). 
 63. See Meese & Larkin, supra note 5, at 729 (“Legislatures and courts 
have made vast changes to the structure of the criminal justice system, to the 
officials who comprise that system, and to the procedures that govern how those 
actors play their roles.”). 
 64. See Martha Shulski & H. Michael Mogil, Alaska’s Climate and Weather, 
WEATHERWISE (Jan.–Feb. 2009), 
http://www.weatherwise.org/archives/back%20issues/2009/january-
february%202009/full-shulski-mogil.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2016) (explaining 
Alaska’s complicated and diverse geography) (on file with Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 65. See The Geography of Alaska, ALASKA: HIST. & CULTURAL STUDS., 
http://www.akhistorycourse.org/articles/article.php?artID=123 (last visited Jan. 
22, 2016) (discussing how Alaska is made up of four interlinked regions) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 66. See id. (discussing how the geography of Alaska influences the climate 
in certain regions). 
 67. See id. (“Large water bodies such as oceans heat and cool more slowly 
than land areas. As a result, coastal areas tend to have less seasonal extremes 
than interior or continental areas.”). 
 68. See id. (listing the four different regions that make up Alaska). 
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riddled with “hills, valleys, and rivers,” even geographers ask the 
question: “How can we make sense of this complexity?”69  
Atop that is the problem that the establishment of Alaska 
CSUs have created.70 They are scattered like jigsaw pieces 
throughout Alaska, with no obvious rhyme or reason for where 
they are located and with no signage indicating where they begin 
and end.71 Unlike the signs at an interstate or national border, 
the federal government does not demark federal land everywhere. 
Without adequate signage, it can be impossible to know when one 
is on land subject to federal regulation. A person can unwittingly 
cross onto federal land and be subject to new, unforeseeable 
crimes. Unlike Alaska’s trespass law, which limits trespass to 
cases where an owner has given notice by “posting in a 
reasonably conspicuous manner under the circumstances,”72 NPS 
regulations have no such requirement. The result is that it can be 
impossible to know when you have driven, hiked, skied, or 
snowshoed your way onto federal land. For a person traversing 
Alaskan terrain, NPS jurisdiction could have the same effect as a 
minefield. 
The criminal law should not be used to trap an unwitting 
public. Anglo-American law has long held that everyone is 
presumed to know the law, so ignorance or a mistake of law is no 
defense to a crime.73 The Supreme Court recognized in Cheek v. 
                                                                                                     
 69. See id. (describing how each region in Alaska is geographically unique). 
 70. See Rebecca Wilhelm, Supreme Court to Hear Arguments in Alaska 
Land-Use Case, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 20, 2016), http://www.bna.com/supreme-court-
hear-n57982066378/    
(last visited Jan. 28, 2016) (“In 1980 Congress passed ANILCA, which was 
designed to resolve land title disputes between the state and native 
corporations. The statute also created conservation system units, establishing 
new national parks and bringing lands reserved for Alaska, private parties and 
native corporations under federal management.”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 71. An amicus brief filed by Alaska in the Supreme Court contains a map of 
the state with disputed areas outlined showing just how complex and 
unpredictable they are. See Brief for State of Alaska as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners at app. 1, Sturgeon v. Frost, No. 14-1209 (9th Cir. Nov. 
23, 2015), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/14-
1209_amicus_pet_Alaska.authcheckdam.pdf (providing a map of the federal 
Conservation System Units within Alaska). 
 72. ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.350(b)(2) (2015). 
 73. See, e.g., Meese & Larkin, supra note 5, at 738 (noting that it was 
previously acceptable to expect people to be knowledgeable of the law; with the 
STURGEON V. FROST 391 
United States74 that the rule is “[b]ased on the notion that the law 
is definite and knowable.”75 Given the reams of regulations that 
exist today, that assumption is no longer true; in fact, it is 
laughable.76  
Congress and the courts should align the criminal law with 
contemporary reality by endorsing a Mistake-of-Law Defense to 
protect good people from being tripped up by unknowable rules. 
Otherwise, the invisible borders of federal jurisdiction and the 
NPS’s strict liability rules will repeat the injustice that the 1997 
prosecution of three-time Indy 500 winner Bobby Unser caused.77 
The federal government prosecuted Unser for unlawfully 
operating a snowmobile on prohibited land even though he 
became lost and nearly died in a blinding blizzard.78 Like Unser, 
Alaskans—and visitors to that state—are at risk of being subject 
to rules that they do not know, in places where they have no way 
of knowing that they apply.79 
                                                                                                     
passage of time, however, the law is becoming more complex, making it difficult 
for people to know every law). 
 74. 498 U.S. 192 (1991).   
 75. Id. at 199. 
 76. See Mukasey & Larkin, supra note 62 ([T]he sheer number of federal 
laws that impose criminal penalties has grown to an unmanageable point.”). 
 77. See Conn Carroll, Bobby Unser vs. the Feds, DAILY SIGNAL (Mar. 14, 
2011), http://dailysignal.com/2011/03/14/bobby-unser-vs-the-feds/ (last visited 
Jan. 26, 2016) (discussing concerns with “overcriminalization” and how offenses 
that are not morally blameworthy are now being criminalized) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); Brian W. Walsh, Traps for the Innocent, 
HERITAGE FOUND. (Oct. 15, 2010), 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Commentary/2010/10/Traps-for-the-Innocent 
(“Unser was convicted of a federal crime for allegedly operating a snowmobile in 
a national wilderness. If he did indeed enter it, he did so unknowingly while he 
and a friend were lost for two days and two nights in a ground blizzard.”). 
 78. See Susan Drumheller, Unser: Blizzard Sent Him off Trail Auto Racing 
Champion Recounts Accidental Foray in Wilderness, SPOKESMAN-REV. (Feb. 14, 
1997), http://www.spokesman.com/stories/1997/feb/14/unser-blizzard-sent-him-
off-trail-auto-racing/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2016) (explaining the events 
surrounding Bobby Unser’s citation for snowmobiling in the wilderness of 
Colorado) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 79. See Robert Barnes, A Moose-Hunter and His Hovercraft Tell the 
Supreme Court Alaska Is Different, WASH. POST (Jan. 18, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/a-moose-hunter-and-his-
hovercraft-tell-the-supreme-court-alaska-is-different/2016/01/18/f9a2e9ee-bb10-
11e5-b682-4bb4dd403c7d_story.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2016) (discussing 
that, because Alaska is a big state, of which the federal government owns 60% of 
the land, it is difficult for someone to determine if they are on federal or state 
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Finally, a Mistake-of-Law Defense is also straightforward 
and easy for courts to apply. The defense would entitle a 
defendant to be exonerated if a reasonable person in the 
defendant’s position would not have believed—and if the 
defendant himself did not believe—that the charged conduct was 
illegal.80 That standard focuses on the problem of notice and 
directly addresses the notice problem.81 The defense also would 
not burden the government. A defendant can be required to bear 
the burden of producing evidence to support this defense, as well 
as the burden of persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence.82 
Also, “[a]s a practical matter, a defendant will need to testify at 
trial in order to persuade the jury that he did not know that his 
conduct was prohibited.”83 Once a defendant testifies the 
prosecution can cross-examine him to persuade the jury that he 
should not be believed.84 Accordingly, the government will have 
ample opportunity to challenge the defense. 
Conclusion 
Regardless of who wins in Sturgeon v. Frost, the case 
demonstrates a compelling need for a Mistake-of-Law Defense. 
Sturgeon shows that there can be not only inadequate notice of 
what is a crime, but also of where that is the case. NPS’s failure 
to mark clearly its jurisdictional borders also reveals why this 
defense is necessary: people often have no way of knowing 
                                                                                                     
land) (on file with the Washington and Lee law Review). 
 80. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Fighting Back Against Overcriminalization: The 
Elements of a Mistake of Law Defense, HERITAGE FOUND. (June 12, 2013), 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/06/fighting-back-against-
overcriminalization-the-elements-of-a-mistake-of-law-defense (explaining the 
elements of the Mistake-of-Law Defense that a defendant will need to prove to 
use this defense). 
 81. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., A Mistake of Law Defense as a Remedy for 
Overcriminalization, 26 A.B.A. J. CRIM. JUST. 10, 15–16 (Spring 2013) (setting 
forth a draft statute creating a Mistake-of-Law Defense). 
 82. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Taking Mistakes Seriously, 28 BYU J. PUB. L. 
71, 109 n.143 (2013) (collecting cases holding that the defendant can be made to 
bear the burdens of production and proof on a defense). 
 83. Id. at 109. 
 84. See id. at 108–09 (explaining why there are no other practical problems 
with a Mistake-of-Law Defense). 
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whether they are on federal land. Because the average person in 
the Alaskan wilderness has no notice of all conduct that is a 
crime, a Mistake-of-Law Defense is needed to accommodate the 
realities of law and life. 
 
